FORUM

CAUSES OF VOTING FOR THE RADICAL RIGHT

Editors’ Note: The manuscript below by Wouter van der Brug and Meindert Fennema started as a book review, which grew into a full-length argument about recent research on the topic of the radical-right electorate. The *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* had the manuscript reviewed as a regular research article, and the reviewers suggested publication because they thought that the arguments were valuable for the international public opinion research community. Accepting the manuscript for publication, the editors also offered the authors whose work is criticized in the manuscript the chance to respond. Marco Giugni and Ruud Koopmans took this chance, and their rejoinder is also published here.

W.D./M.W.T.

WHAT CAUSES PEOPLE TO VOTE FOR A RADICAL-RIGHT PARTY? A REVIEW OF RECENT WORK

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Over the past two decades, Western Europe has experienced the surge of parties such as Front Nationale in France, Vlaams Belang (formerly Vlaams Blok) in Belgium, and the Danish Peoples Party in Denmark. They are often called radical-right parties (Norris, 2005), extreme right parties (Carter, 2005; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005), or anti-immigration parties (Fennema, 1997). We have argued elsewhere (Fennema, 1997; Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005) that such parties should better be labeled ‘anti-immigrant’ or ‘anti-immigration’ because their common denominator is that the immigration issue is their unique selling point. However, in this review of some of the most recent literature, we will use the term radical right because it is the one used most often.

In most European countries, there are parties that can be labeled ‘radical right,’ and in some countries such parties even have a well-established electoral record and a relatively stable party history. Such is the case in Austria with the FPÖ, in Flanders with the Vlaams Blok (now called Vlaams Belang for legal reasons), in France with the Front National, and in Norway with the Progress Party. In Austria and in Italy,
the radical right has even been a ruling party for some time. In other countries, radical-right parties have been successful but their support has been highly volatile (Denmark and the Netherlands). Norris (2005) uses the label ‘flash parties’ for parties such as the Lijst Pim Fortuyn in The Netherlands, because they seem to come from nowhere, attracting scores of voters, and after that disappear without leaving much of a trace. Finally, in some countries, such as Germany, Great Britain, Greece, and Spain, radical-right parties have never had much electoral support.

This amazing variation calls for an explanation that goes beyond the socio-structural model of voting behavior, since the social conditions that supposedly caused the surge of radical-right parties do not vary much between the different European countries and hence cannot account for their different fortunes. The claim that voters for the radical right are ‘the losers of modernity’ (Betz 1994) is therefore not very helpful to explain these spectacular differences. Recently, a number of books and articles have been published that provide alternative explanations for the differences in electoral success of the radical right. In this contribution, we will evaluate these studies.

A REVIEW OF RECENT STUDIES

DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITY AND THE NEGLECT OF DEMAND-SIDE EXPLANATIONS

The book by Koopmans et al. (2005) suggests that the vote for the radical right cannot be explained at all by most of the sociological variables. This in many ways laudable book focuses on radical-right parties and movements. The analysis is based on public claims making, i.e., the political claims addressed in public as measured by accounts in the national newspapers of France, Germany, The Netherlands, Great Britain, and Switzerland. Koopmans et al. (2005) start from the social movements theories in which the concept of (political) opportunity structure plays a central role. Older theories of social protest explain the rise of protest by discontent and grievances among citizens. These explanations are often referred to as ‘grievance theories.’ Social movement theories criticize them for not focusing on the role of networks and organizations that mobilize feelings of discontent. Moreover, these theories stress the need to include institutional and discursive opportunities in the analysis of social movements. Koopmans et al. (2005) refer to theories that focus on the political opportunity structure as ‘supply-side theories’ and to theories that focus on grievances as ‘demand-side theories.’ They juxtapose these as two competing theoretical perspectives, ‘one that focuses on grievances and ethnic competition, and the other that stresses opportunities and institutional frameworks’ (p. 146).

The authors claim that grievance theories (demand side) do not explain the variation in extreme right violence and electoral success of radical-right parties, and propose a (revised) supply-side explanation instead. It is surprising, however,
that they present these theories as two competing ones. When using a rational choice perspective in which voters and parties are presented as actors who operate in a political market, an explanation that discards the demand side is necessarily one-sided and incomplete. The only rationale for excluding the demand side from the analyses could be that it is a constant across different contexts, but this needs to be demonstrated rather than assumed.

Koopmans et al. (2005) developed the concept of ‘discursive opportunities,’ which they define as the dominant discourses on immigrants and immigration. The authors maintain that discursive opportunity structures in combination with the political space available explain a large part of the radical right violence and of the electoral success of radical-right parties. Combination of these two variables leads them to a typology of opportunities for radical-right mobilization: Strong discursive opportunity structures combined with restricted political space leads to radicalization. Strong discursive opportunity structure combined with ample political space leads to institutionalization (i.e., party formation). Weak discursive opportunities and restricted political space leads to marginalization. And, finally, weak discursive opportunities combined with ample political space leads to populism (p.149).

This is a very original approach, which is ad oculum supported by impressive evidence in terms of public claims making. Koopmans et al. show that in France, where discursive opportunities are weak, but political space for the radical right is wide, claims are predominantly coming from parties and very few from unknown actors. In Germany, on the other hand, where discursive opportunities are strong but the political space is restricted, radical right claims coming from parties are relatively few, while unknown actors account for nearly half of all claims. Such figures are supportive of the hypothesis presented by Koopmans (1996) and Kriesi (1999), according to which radical-right violence is inversely related to the institutionalization of radical-right movements.

The conceptualization of a discursive opportunity structure (DOS) alongside a political opportunity structure (POS) is a theoretical step forward. Yet, it is doubtful whether discursive opportunities should be conceptualized (and operationalized) as supply-side factors only, as the authors do. In our view, discursive opportunities that arise from the framing of ethnic or civic conceptions of nationhood and citizenship are at least in part an element of the demand side of radical-right mobilization. Indeed, the grievance theory—rightly labeled as a demand-side explanation—suffers from naïve realism, in the sense that it assumes that social grievances translate directly into political claims making. However, grievances do lead to claims making through the discourse in which they are framed. We agree with Koopmans et al. that grievances do not exist without discourse. But the reverse is also true: Without grievances political entrepreneurs will not be able to successfully mobilize public support for claims regarding these grievances. By excluding the demand side from the explanation, the authors apparently assume that the demand side is a constant, or to phrase it differently, that grievances are the same everywhere. This, however, is an empirical question. Our own work has shown that a properly specified model of electoral support for radical-right parties should contain demand side and supply-side factors (Van der Brug et al., 2005).
ISSUES OF DEFINING AND LABELING RADICAL-RIGHT PARTIES

Another weakness in Koopmans et al. (2005) is the fact that radical right claims making—which they treat as a dependent variable—is subdivided in radical right violent and unconventional mobilization on the one hand and electoral success of radical-right parties on the other. These two—possibly inversely related—dependent variables create confusion within the model presented by the authors. Sometimes they claim a variation in the dependent variable ‘extreme right mobilization’ by referring just to electoral success of radical-right parties (p. 185), and sometimes they claim a variation in the same dependent variable by referring to ‘extreme right violence’ (p. 184). Nevertheless, their theoretical approach, which distinguishes three determinants of their dependent variables (national configurations of citizenship; party competition and strategic repertoires of the radical-right movement itself) is very promising. One would, however, wish for a more appropriate term than ‘extreme right parties.’ Although the authors nowhere discuss this concept, they implicitly define it by structure and ideology.

The focus on structure follows from their definition of extreme right parties as non-established parties. However, Front National is still not considered an established party, although it was founded by Le Pen as early as 1972 and was the second biggest party in the 2002 presidential elections. At the same time, the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) founded by Chirac in 1976 is considered to be an established party. This is surely not because of its impeccable civic record because prior to its replacement by the UMP, the RPR had been increasingly embroiled in judicial proceedings following from the corruption scandals in the Paris region. Its former secretary-general Alain Juppé was sentenced in 2004 for a related felony. What then, in terms of structure, makes the FN a non-established party? And what in terms of ideology makes the FN an extreme right party?

According to Koopmans et al. the political parties that are part of the extreme right are the ‘immigrants’ clearest opponents within the field of contention’ (p. 29). And elsewhere, the authors’ state: ‘Perhaps the common denominator of all those actors who can be considered as belonging to the extreme right is their ethnoculturalism.’ However, Fennema (1997) has analyzed the ideology of extreme right parties and movements in historical perspective and concluded that ethnoculturalism (or ethnic nationalism) is but one of four constituting elements of extreme right ideology, the other three being anti-materialism, rejection of liberal democracy, and the use of conspiracy theories in their propaganda. In light of this, Fennema and Pollmann (1998) have analyzed, by interviewing their leaders, the ideologies of the parties that constituted part of the so-called ‘Technical Group of the European Right’ in the European Parliament. They found that, even though some parties may truthfully be labeled extreme right, the common denominator of this new party family is their rejection of immigration based on ethnoculturalism. Hence, in our opinion the most accurate label is anti-immigration parties, but we would already be happy if the authors would refrain from the term ‘extreme right’ and use the label ‘radical right.’

MEASURES OF ELECTORAL SUCCESS: VOTES OR SEATS?

Another new book that emphasizes supply-side factors to explain the variation in electoral support among radical-right parties is Givens (2005). Givens presents
comparative research employing national election studies from Austria, France, and Germany and adding Denmark in a last chapter. Unfortunately, these data were not designed for comparative research, and the explanation for the variation in radical right voting is necessarily provisional. Taking the seminal work of Kitschelt (1995) as a starting point, Givens finds that electoral systems which induce strategic voting are less likely to produce successful radical-right parties. Givens’ analysis is based on only four countries, which is of course a shaky basis to conclude that electoral systems matter. Worse, however, is that Givens makes her case by changing the dependent variable from electoral support to seats won in parliament (pp. 131 and 153). It is hardly surprising that FN gained seats as a result of the change from the first-past the post-system to proportional representation in France. The real surprise is that this change in electoral system had little impact on the percentage of votes FN obtained. Givens should have been warned because Carter (2002) found that proportional representation has no significant impact on the percentage of votes for the radical right. Van der Brug et al. (2005) confirmed this conclusion.

The general idea of Givens’ book, that electoral opportunity structures matter because they induce or hamper strategic voting, is a fruitful one. The hypothesis that coalition signals of mainstream parties may influence radical right voting is worth testing. Givens’ focus on the strategies of mainstream parties to explain variations in radical right voting is innovative. Yet, the evidence presented in her book is far from convincing. Moreover, it is unfortunate that her conclusions do not relate to the recent literature. This may be due to the extended production time of the publication. Givens’ research was conducted between 1997 and 1999, while most of her survey data were collected before 1997. Yet, the book was not published until 2007.

EVIDENCE OF PROTEST VOTING

More systematic and elaborate, but less theoretically informed is the book by Norris (2005). Starting from the same questions as Givens, her data are much better suited for comparative analysis and the number of countries taken into consideration is much larger. Norris uses the European Social Survey 2002 and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996–2001. Just like Givens, Norris starts out to show that socio-structural factors cannot explain the rise of radical-right parties. ‘Simple accounts of structural change have limited capacity to explain such phenomenon’ (p. 12). Norris also discards resentment as a causal factor in the rise and the uneven electoral fortunes of radical-right parties. In this respect, Norris often agrees with the work of Van der Burg, Fennema, and Tillie (2000, 2005), which she cites with approval (pp. 134–135, 150–151). However, Norris criticizes Van der Brug et al. (2000) for failing ‘to consider any direct evidence for or against protest voting, such as indicators of political disaffection, trust, and alienation among radical-right supporters’ (p. 151).

This remark has to be put in the perspective of the popularity of the protest vote model (Betz 1994; Martin, 1996; Derks & Deschouwer 1998; Mudde & Van Holsteyn 2000; Swyngedouw 2001; Bélanger & Aarts 2006). Van der Brug et al. (2000) conceptualized protest voting as a rational, goal-directed activity. The prime motive behind a protest vote is to show discontent with the political elite. Since radical-right parties are treated as outcasts by a large part of the elites in their countries, votes for
these parties frighten or shock these elites, which is exactly what the protest voter wants to accomplish (Van der Eijk, Franklin, & Marsh, 1996). Following this definition, but also most of the literature on protest voting, the concept of a protest vote consists of two elements: First, discontent with ruling parties and politicians (reflected in political cynicism, or lack of political trust) should have a strong effect on support for a radical-right party (Van der Brug 2003; Bélanger & Aarts 2006). And second, in the words of Lubbers and Scheepers (2000, p. 69), ‘political attitudes ... are expected to be of minor importance’ (Mayer & Perrineau, 1992; Kitschelt, 1995, Mudde & Van Holsteyn, 2000).

So, in order to demonstrate that votes for radical-right parties are indeed largely protest votes, one should study the effects of measures of discontent as well as measures of policy voting. Since Van der Brug et al. (2000) only studied one of the two elements of protest voting, they were not offered the chance to demonstrate protest voting even if it had indeed occurred. However, the study did show that votes for most radical-right parties could not be considered protest votes, because the second element of protest voting (a weak effect of policy preferences) did not apply to them. Support for radical-right parties was just as much motivated by ideological and pragmatic considerations as support for other parties, so it was concluded that protest voting was not an adequate explanation for the support of these parties.

Other scholars have argued that someone who casts a policy vote for a radical-right party could combine the ideological motive with the desire to show discontent with the political elite (Swyngedouw, 2001). This argument is in itself convincing but it renders the concept of a protest vote meaningless. If someone is dissatisfied with the EU policies of the current Labour government in Britain and decides to support the Conservatives in the European election, few would call that a protest vote. However, if this same voter was more radical and voted for the UK Independence Party, some observers do interpret this as a protest vote. So, the concept of a protest vote is in fact restricted to votes for a ‘non-established party,’ a concept that in itself contains biased ambiguities as we have seen earlier.

A recent example of this type of reasoning is a study by Bélanger and Aarts (2006). They estimated the effect of discontent on the vote in the Dutch elections of 2002. It turned out that discontent exerted an almost equally weak (and statistically insignificant) effect on the vote for the radical-right LPF as on that for the Christian Democratic party, which was at that time the largest opposition force. They interpret this effect—even though it is not significant—as evidence in support of the protest vote hypothesis. Yet, they did not answer the question of whether Christian Democratic voters should be considered protest voters as well.

To avoid this confusion, we have proposed to distinguish more clearly between the motivations underlying a policy vote and those underlying a protest vote. Conceptualized in this way, votes for the successful European radical-right parties, such as Vlaams Blok, Alleanza Nazionale, the FPÖ, Dansk Folkepartit, and the LPF, should be classified as policy votes rather than protest votes.

Norris claims that there is some support for the protest vote thesis by presenting a (weak) relationship between voting for ‘radical-right parties’ and trust in political institutions. In addition, she presents a correlation between satisfaction with government and voting for a radical-right party. Yet, the latter correlation is positive: Voters for
radical-right parties show (slightly) more satisfaction with their government than other voters. Norris emphasizes the small negative effect of institutional trust on the radical right vote, without, however, mentioning the fact that the explained variance of her model is a mere 5 percent in a model with 13 predictors of party choice (p. 157). When attitudes toward immigration, asylum seekers and multiculturalism are included in the model, the explained variance is 22 percent (p. 183). We would thus argue that these findings confirm the main thrust of the conclusions reached by Van der Brug et al. (2006), which is that these voters should be considered policy voters rather than protest voters.

THE INFLUENCE OF MAINSTREAM COMPETITION

After testing several demand-side explanations for the radical right vote, Norris moves to various supply-side explanations. Unfortunately, her approach is somewhat limited by the preponderance of bivariate perspectives. She singles out several partial explanations, and tests each of them in a separate analysis. Several authors have shown in multivariate analyses that the electoral fortunes of radical-right parties are affected significantly by the competition these parties face from mainstream competitors from the right (Kitschelt, 1995; Carter, 2005; Koopmans et al., 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005). Norris computes a bivariate correlation between the left/right position of the main competitor and the vote shares of 16 parties, finds that the correlation—which points in the theoretically predicted direction—is not significant and concludes that: ‘(...) there are grounds for scepticism surrounding the claim that the ideological positions of the mainstream parties provide automatic opportunities for radical-right parties’ (p. 196). The problem here is twofold. First, nobody claimed anything about ‘automatic opportunities’. Instead, Van der Brug et al. (2005) proposed a two-stage model, where three necessary conditions are specified for radical-right parties to become successful. Low competition from mainstream right-wing parties is thus a necessary but not a sufficient (as implied by using the term ‘automatic’) condition for electoral success. Second, Van der Brug et al. (2005, p. 560) showed that the bivariate relationship was indeed not very strong ($r = -0.49$), but that the effect is substantially stronger in a multivariate model ($\beta = -0.72$).

DO ELECTORAL SYSTEMS MATTER?

Norris’ book mainly brings together various existing explanations. Its main original new insight is that the extent of ideological voting depends on the kind of electoral system. In a proportional system, voters will evaluate radical-right parties by ideological considerations, whereas in majoritarian electoral systems the effect of left/right is weak. Previous studies that tested the effect of electoral systems on the vote share of radical-right parties have not found such an effect (Carter 2002, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005). Norris argues that electoral systems do matter, but not in a direct way. Rather, she hypothesizes that electoral systems moderate the effect of ideological voting. Since this is potentially a valuable new insight, it would have deserved to be tested rigorously. However, the main finding of the book is based on four separate analyses of four parties only, whereas in the outset of her book Norris selects radical-right parties from 39 different countries.
It is unfortunate that Norris’ ambitious project to give explanations for the rise of the radical right in 39 countries contains many quick and dirty analyses. The suspicion about the lack of carefulness is increased by the frequency with which she refers to tables that are identified by two question marks: ‘(see Table ??)’. Norris’s publication output is very impressive and some of her books have become classics in our field. Unfortunately, however, this book was written with too much haste, and as a result it does not make the kind of contribution to the field that it could have made.

**Broad Approaches**

The book by Carter (2005) is, compared to that of Givens and Norris, superior in its theoretical framework and much better in terms of scientific rigor. Carter tests various supply-side explanations for variations in electoral fortunes of, what she calls, right-wing extremist parties. She focuses on four sets of supply-side variables: (a) party ideologies, (b) organizational structures and leaderships, (c) party competition, and (d) electoral systems. She tests this explanation on data sets in which radical-right-wing parties are the units of analysis. Depending on the variables included in the analyses her multivariate analyses are based on 77 or 134 parties. In her multiple regression model, she shows that only a few variables really matter. All other things being equal, parties with a xenophobic program or image have a greater chance of winning votes than the more extreme neo-Nazi or neo-fascist parties (this confirms Golder, 2003). Party-organization and leadership impact upon the capacity to attract votes. Yet, the most important factor that makes radical-right parties successful is the ideological convergence between mainstream left and mainstream right parties. Together these factors explain about 50 percent of the variation in radical-right parties’ electoral fortunes. Interestingly, none of the institutional variables that Carter included in her model does have a significant impact upon the radical-right party’s capacity to attract votes.

Carter’s findings are in line with the findings of Van der Brug et al. (2005) who analyzed the variation in electoral results of 25 radical-right parties in 22 elections in Continental Europe between 1989 and 1999. They found two supply-side factors and one demand-side variable that together explained 83 percent of the variation in electoral fortunes of the parties included in their study. The supply-side variables are (a) the degree to which the party is seen by the electorate as a ‘normal party,’ which means it has to be seen as democratic and it has to have such credibility, and (b) the ideological position of its mainstream competitor. The first variable has a positive effect: The more a party is seen as a ‘normal’ democratic party, the higher is its electoral success (all other things being equal). This variable is strongly related to Carter’s typology of the ideologies of radical-right parties. The parties that she classifies as neo-Nazi and neo-fascist are typically the parties that are not seen by the electorates as ‘normal’ democratic parties. The second variable has a negative effect. When the largest mainstream right-wing party moves to the right on the ideological spectrum, this reduces the proportion of votes obtained by a radical-right party. This variable is very similar to Carter’s measurement of the ideological convergence of the mainstream left and mainstream right parties.
Yet, this leaves unexplained the difference in adjusted $R^2$, which was .49 and .54 (depending on the selection of cases) in Carter’s model, while it was .83 in the model of Van der Brug et al. This difference is to some extent due to the fact that Van der Brug et al. also take a demand-side variable into account, i.e., the percentage of voters positioning themselves at the far right end of a left/right continuum. The integration of demand-side and supply-side factors in one model is a step forward in the explanation of the electoral success of radical-right parties. However, without this demand-side variable, the model of Van der Brug et al. explains 73 percent of the variance in electoral support, which is still substantially more than Carter’s model. Presumably, this is the result of the fact that the characteristics of parties themselves were operationalized differently in the two studies.

CONCLUSIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

Most research on the radical right in the 1990s has focused on social characteristics of voters for such parties. These voters were depicted as the losers of modernity who supported radical-right parties to express resentment against immigrants and/or the political elite (Betz, 1994). More recently, a number of books and articles were published that aim to answer the question of why some of these parties are successful in elections and why others fail. These recent publications have one thing in common: They all adopt a rational choice perspective, where parties and voters are seen as representing the supply and demand side of an electoral market. Surprisingly, however, most of these recent works focus on the supply side only, as if characteristics of citizens such as their attitudes, preferences, and feelings of discontent were inconsequential to the electoral fortunes of the radical right. A valid explanation of variations in electoral fortunes of radical-right parties needs to integrate demand and supply-side factors.

Having said this, we should, however, admit that models exclusively focusing on the supply side (Carter, 2005; Koopmans et al., 2005) explain most of the variance in electoral support for the radical right. This is also true of our own model (Van der Brug et al., 2005), which explains 83 percent of the variance with demand- and supply-side variables, and 73 percent with supply-side variables only. The most likely explanation is that there is not so much systematic variation between different countries at the demand side. In all post-industrial societies, there is a substantial group of citizens with so much fear of immigrants that they are willing to support a radical-right party if they see it as democratic, and if the established parties provide no alternative. Therefore, Carter (2005) and Koopmans et al. (2005) could provide good explanations without taking the demand side into account.

Given our state of knowledge of radical-right parties and their voters, what should be high on the research agenda? Recently, Coffè, Heyndels, and Vermeir (2007) focused on contextual variables that partly explain the votes for the Vlaams Blok in Flemish municipalities. Among these, they identify a high average income as a quality of the municipalities where the Vlaams Blok participates in the local elections, which is contrary to what is generally assumed. Another contextual variable that predicts a higher percentage of votes for the Vlaams Blok is the presence of Turkish and Maghrebian inhabitants, whereas the presence of other immigrants has no effect.
This relationship has often been assumed but hardly ever supported by sound empirical evidence. Only a few researchers have found a positive correlation between the number of immigrants living in a constituency and the support for radical-right parties (Scheepers, Eisinga, & Lammers, 1994; Bijlsma & Koopmans, 1996; Martin, 1996). The explanation was that voters in these areas compete with immigrants for scarce resources, such as jobs and houses. People who live in these areas and who feel the strongest threat from immigrants are unskilled workers. Yet, the interesting result from Coffé et al. is that this only goes for Islamic immigrants and not for immigrants from other countries. In fact, the presence of immigrants from other countries has a negative effect, but not a significant one. Hence, the economic competition thesis has to be rejected in favor of a thesis that includes cultural elements. Here, new research is necessary to find out what cultural factors cause voters to swing to the radical right.

Coffé and associates also show that the Vlaams Blok tends to be more successful in municipalities with low levels of social capital. Some evidence has been found in support of the social isolation hypothesis in France (Mayer & Perrineau, 1992; Martin, 1996), Germany (Mayer & Moreau, 1995), and Flanders (Billiet & Witte, 1995), but the evidence provided by Coffé and her associates is based on more detailed data and sophisticated analysis, and hence is more convincing. The theory that lack of civic community leads voters to vote for radical right is one of the oldest in the history of electoral research on the radical-right parties (Arendt, 1951; Bendix, 1952). Yet, it has never been convincingly been proven or discarded. New databases and new methods may well do better here.

Innovative research has been recently published by Veugelers (2005) on the support for the Front National by European ex-colonials from Algeria. Veugelers’ research shows that these ‘pied-noirs’ tend to vote more often for the Front National than the other French citizens. This relationship becomes even stronger when the members of the ‘nostalgic’ associations of these pied-noirs are taken separately. In the 2002, presidential elections half of the members of such associations voted Le Pen. In a multivariate regression analysis, this relationship becomes weaker when racial prejudice is included in the model (Veugelers, 2005, p. 423). Veugelers’ analysis, nevertheless, reminds us that some very obvious socio-cultural cleavages should be taken into account. It seems so obvious that ethnic minorities do tend to vote less for radical-right parties that this is hardly ever taken into serious consideration. Ethnic minorities tend to be highly underrepresented in our samples, but it seems nevertheless important to control for this factor. Yet, as the electoral analyses of the Pim Fortuyn 2002 landslide victory in the municipal elections in Rotterdam show, it is by no means impossible that radical-right parties are also supported by migrant voters. This is certainly one of the new directions the research of radical-right parties should pursue. Especially, since the second and third generation of migrant residents can hardly be called migrants anymore. Yet, they may pursue a degree of ethnic voting (Michon & Tillie, 2003).

Another research line to be followed is the gender gap: Most researchers acknowledge that the radical-right parties have a larger male constituency, but the reason for this has hardly been theorized and further analyzed (Gidengil, Henningar, Blais, Nevitte, & Nadeau, 2003; Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007).
The degree of state repression of radical-right parties may well explain part of the variation in their electoral success, but the evidence is somewhat mixed (Downs, 2002; Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2004). Until now, little research has been conducted in this field, not even in Germany and The Netherlands where repression of radical-right parties has been stronger than anywhere in Europe (Fennema, 2000).

An important line of research focuses on the relationship between, on the one hand, state repression and strategies of established parties to isolate radical-right parties and movements, and their propensity to radicalize on the other hand (Koopmans, 1996; Husbands, 2002; Giugni et al., 2005; Erb & Minkenberg, forthcoming; Minkenberg, 2006; Van Spanje & Van der Brug, forthcoming). The evidence suggests that exclusion and state repression leads to stronger feelings of solidarity within the group and stronger feelings of antagonism towards outsiders, which in turn leads to radicalization. However, most of the evidence is based on the experience in only a few countries, so that more evidence is needed on the effects of repression and exclusion.

Finally, very little is known about the role of the mass media (Walgrave & De Swert, 2004). It has been argued that, as a result of decreasing membership of parties, decreasing importance of ideologies in politics and increasing diffusion of mass media, the role of party leaders has become more important (Mény & Surel, 2002). In an audience democracy (Manin, 1997), these leaders need the mass media to provide them with a stage from where they can communicate with their voters. Recent research showed that Pim Fortuyn in the Dutch national elections of 2002 benefited from excessive media attention (Kleinneijenhuis, Oegema, De Ridder, Van Hoof, & Vliegenthart, 2003). Yet, Vlaams Blok managed to have sustained electoral success in the 1990s despite being largely boycotted by the media. More research is needed on the role of the media in affecting public opinion towards immigrants and support for radical-right parties.

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**BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE**

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